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ABSTRACT
Industrial cyber-physical systems are hybrid systems with strict
safety requirements. Despite not having a formal semantics, most
of these systems are modeled using Stateflow/Simulink® for mainly
two reasons: (1) it is easier to model, test, and simulate using these
tools, and (2) dynamics of these systems are not supported by
most other tools. Furthermore, with the ever growing complexity
of cyber-physical systems, grows the gap between what can be
modeled using an automatic formal verification tool and models of
industrial cyber-physical systems. In this paper, we present a simple
formal model for self-deriving cars. While after some simplification,
safety of this system has already been proven manually, to the best
of our knowledge, no automatic formal verification tool supports
its dynamics. We hope this serves as a challenge problem for formal
verification tools targeting industrial applications.
KEYWORDS
Model Checking, Cyber-Physical System, Challenge Problem, Au-
tomatic Formal Verification
1 INTRODUCTION
The following paragraph is taken directly from [25]. According to
the authors, two ingredients are missing from the race for who will
have the first self-driving car on the road: (1) standardization of
safety assurance, and (2) scalability.
The “Winter of AI” is commonly known as the decades
long period of inactivity following the collapse of Arti-
ficial Intelligence research that over-reached its goals
and hyped its promise until the inevitable fall during
the early 80s. We believe that the development of Au-
tonomous Vehicles (AV) is dangerously moving along
a similar path that might end in great disappointment
after which further progress will come to a halt for
many years to come.
A typical approach to estimate the amount of safety assurance
while preserving scalability, is to use statistical techniques, in which
one simulates the system or collects actual/random data. To ap-
preciate the problematic nature of a data-driven approach, authors
in [25] prove, in order to have 10−9 fatality per hour in an au-
tonomous vehicle, one require 109 hours of data, which for example
means, 1000 employees must drive 24 hours a day, 7 days a week,
for 114 years! Even worse, every time part of a system gets updated,
no matter how small, preserving the guarantee requires repeating
the whole data collection.
To solve the safety standardization problem, [25] suggests the
notion of “who is responsible” for an accident in a non-deterministic
setting. Intuitively, instead of trying to build a system in which no
accident occurs, “Responsibility-Sensitive Safety”, tries to prevent
car c from only those accidents in which c is going to be blamed.
In other words, if a car drives responsibly, it might still be involved
in an accident, but it will never be blamed for one. To achieve
this goal, [25] defines two major components: (1) a policy that
cars should follow, and (2) a mechanism to identify responsible
parity (or parties) in case of an accident (they are exactly those
who will be blamed for the accident). The majority of the paper is
devoted to different policies in different conditions, like moving in
the same direction or in the opposite directions, moving laterally
or longitudinally, moving on a straight road or road with other
geometries, and who should be blamed in case of accident in each
of those conditions.
After a policy is defined, one has to show it does not blame
those who follow it and at least one party in each accident will
be blamed (otherwise a policy that prevents nothing won’t blame
anyone for an accident, but also does not prevent any accident from
happening). Unfortunately, all these proofs or in some cases only
sketches of proofs are done manually in [25]. However, to the best
of our knowledge, there is no automatic formal verification tool
that can be used to prove these properties. Even worse, we are not
aware of any automatic formal verification tool that can be used
to specify these properties. This was our motivation to write this
paper, in which we specify the most basic and fundamental policies
defined in [25] and challenge current and any future automatic
formal verification tool for cyber-physical system to solve any of
the five challenge problems in this paper.
In Section 2, we review preliminary definitions we need in this
paper. In Section 3, we formally specify system and policy defined
in [25], for the case when finite number of cars are driving on a
straight road. The rigorous level of the specifications in this paper
is high enough to seamlessly write them all in a theorem prover
like PVS [18] or Lean [5]. This removes any ambiguities from policy
and system dynamics 1. Having policy and system dynamics clearly
defined, next we specify five different fundamental problems about
these specification in Section 4. The first four are about (robust)
1Through this process we observed a couple of problems/inconsistencies with the
specifications in [25] (they are mentioned at different places in this paper).
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safety and (robust) liveness, and the last one, is about the policy
when not every car follows it. We use signals (a function from
a non-negative real value as time to a point in a metric space)
to specify all of our system dynamics, policy, and problems. This
makes our specifications uniform but not constructive, i.e. it does
not specify how to build a system that follows those specifications.
In Section 5, we list nine different tools and six different reasons
that prevent us from even specifying our problems in these tools.
This is after ignoring all the difficulties that may arise when one
wants to encode everything in the language of one of these tools.
All these tools are written solely for the purpose of formal model
checking cyber-physical systems. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section 6.
2 PRELIMINARIES
We denote the set of natural, positive natural, real, positive real, and
non-negative real numbers by N, N+, R, R+, and R≥0, respectively.
For any two sets A and B, size of A is denoted by |A|, and the set
of functions from A to B is denoted by A −→ B or BA. Operator −→
is considered to be right-associative, meaning if C is a set then
function f of type A −→ B −→ C is a function that maps every
element of type A to an element of type B −→ C .
2.1 Extended Metric Space and Distance
Functions
Let M be an arbitrary set and d : M ×M −→ R ∪ {∞} be an ar-
bitrary function. Ordered pair (M,d) is called an extended metric
space and d is called a distance function iff for any x ,y, z : M the
following conditions hold: (1) d(x ,y) ≥ 0, (2) d(x ,y) = 0⇔ x = y,
(3) d(x ,y) = d(y,x), and (4) d(x , z) ≤ d(x ,y) + d(y, z). If distance
function d is known from the context, we use M to also refer to
the metric space. Let X be a finite set of variables, andM ⊆ RX be
an arbitrary set. A well-known distance function on M , denoted
by d∞(ν1,ν2), maps any two points ν1,ν2 : M tomax
x :X
|ν1(x) −ν2(x)|.
Let C be a finite set and (M,d) be a metric space. We extend d to
map any two points ν1,ν2 : C −→ M to max
c :C
d(ν1(c),ν2(c)).
2.2 Signal
In this paper we present dynamics of a system and policies both
using signals. This is for two reasons: First, using one formalism
to specify both behavior and policy makes our presentation more
uniform. Second, we intentionally stay away from any class of
hybrid automata or temporal logic, and leave it to the reader to
choose or develop an appropriate formalism for this benchmark.
Definition 1 (Signal). Let (M,d) be an extended metric space.
Signal is any function of type R≥0 −→ M .
Signal f is continuous at time t : R≥0 iff limt ′−→t f (t ′) is defined
and equal to f (t) 2. Signal f is continuous iff it is continuous at all
times. Signal f is piecewise continuous iff number of discontinuities
within any finite amount of time is finite.
2When t = 0, we only consider continuity from right.
3 DYNAMICS AND POLICY
In this paper we only consider the case in which cars are on a
straight road and no car drives in reverse gear. While making the
presentation simpler, this is quite enough to specify our automatic
formal verification challenge problems. Table 1 lists every parameter
that we use in this paper.
Parameter Description
C Finite Set of Cars
ρ : R≥0 Response Time
µ : R+ Minimum Distance Parameter
amax_accel : R+ Maximum Longitudinal Acceleration
amin_brake : R+ Minimum Longitudinal Deceleration
amax_brake : R+ Maximum Longitudinal Deceleration
alatmax_accel : R+ Maximum Lateral Acceleration
alatmin_brake : R+ Minimum Lateral Deceleration
alatmax_brake : R+ Maximum Lateral Deceleration
Table 1: Parameters
The most basic signal in this paper is the position signal that
specifies position of every car on the road throughout the entire
time. The next most fundamental signal in this paper is the delay
signal that models delays in the controller parts of a cyber-physical
system. We first define position and delay signals. Next, we define
minimum longitudinal and lateral distance signals as a function
of position and delay signals. Later, we use these four signals to
uniquely define dangerous situation and blame time signals. These
signals together are almost everything we need to define policy
and verification problems about that policy.
Definition 2 (Position Signal). Let C be an arbitrary finite
set of cars. Position signal is any function of the type f : R≥0 −→
C −→ R{x,y } .
Note that in Definition 2, C −→ R{x,y } is the metric space. Also,
in Definition 2 and every other signal that is defined later in this
paper, we use d∞ as the distance function. Let f be a position signal.
We say f is differentiable at time t : R≥0 iff for every car c : C and
axis u : {x ,y}, limh−→0 (f (t+h) c u)−(f t c u)h is defined 3. We say f
is differentiable iff it is differentiable at all times in R≥0. Furthermore,
we use fv to denote derivative of f and call it velocity signal (note
that fv is also a position signal). Furthermore, if fv is differentiable,
we denote the induced derivative signal by fa and call it acceleration
signal. Finally, we use PosC to denote the set of position signals
f with two conditions: (1) both fv and fa are defined throughout
the entire time domain, and (2) no car has a negative longitudinal
velocity (i.e. ∀t : R≥0, c : C· fv t c y ≥ 0).
Position of different cars is a physical property of our cyber-
physical system and for every signal, each car has a unique position
at every single point in time. However, when a car uses its sensors to
observe positions of different cars including itself, there are at least
3Similar to the continuity definition, if t = 0, we only consider differentiability from
right.
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two sources of errors: (1) measurement errors caused by inaccuracy
of sensors, and (2) slight delay in sensors and controllers (parameter
ρ in Table 1). To handle measurement errors, one has to consider
not only a position signal, but at least all the position signals that
are pointwise close to it. This usually happens in the context of
robust verification [7, 9, 10, 13, 17, 26, 27]. Delays on the other hand,
are usually considered in system models [1, 2, 6, 19, 23], which is
the focus of this section. In order to simplify presentation of later
definitions, we next define a delay signal that assigns a delay to
every pair of cars. If τ is a delay signal, its value for cars c1, c2 : C at
time t : R≥0 models a delayed time in car c1 when it observes state
of car c2 at time t . Although, we use one delay signal throughout
our entire formulation, one can easily extend this to multiple delay
signals, one for each part of the system. Definition 3 formally defines
a delay signal based on response time parameter ρ. Note that, by
definition, there is no delay at time t = 0. Also, if ρ = 0 then there
will be no delay in the future either.
Definition 3 (Delay Signal). Delay signal is any piecewise
continuous signal of type R≥0 −→ C −→ C −→ R≥0 that satisfies ∀t :
R≥0, c1, c2 : C·t − ρ ≤ τ t c1 c2 ≤ t , where ρ : R≥0 is defined in
Table 1. We use DelayC to denote the set of all delay signals for cars
in C.
The general idea in [25] to guarantee safety is to first define a
safe distance between every two cars and then take a proper action
whenever distance is unsafe. The safe distance is computed using
the knowledge a car has about velocity of itself and another car, and
is supposed to be large enough such that the car will have enough
time to respond properly, whenever the distance becomes unsafe.
Definition 4 and Definition 5 define minimum (safe) longitudinal
and lateral distances, respectively.
Definition 4 (Minimum Longitudinal Distance Signal). Let
f and τ be, respectively, position and delay signals. We define min-
imum longitudinal distance signal, denoted by dlonmin , as a function
of type R≥0 −→ C −→ C −→ R+ ∪ {−∞} that maps a time t and cars
c1, c2 : C with t1 B τ t c1 c1 and t2 B τ t c1 c2 to −∞ if c1 = c2 or
f t1 c1 y > f t2 c2 y, and to the maximum of µ and following term,
otherwise:
ρ fv t1 c1 y +
1
2amax_accel ρ
2 +
(fv t1 c1 y + ρ amax_accel)2
2amin_brake
− (fv t2 c2 y)
2
2amax_brake
There is a big difference between Definition 4 and its correspon-
dence in [25]. Definition 4 uses delayed observations, but minimum
distance in [25] is defined assuming exact value of every car’s lon-
gitudinal velocity is known to every other car at all times. Another
difference is that, in Definition 4, we make sure minimum distance
is never smaller than µ, however in [25] this distance can become
arbitrary close to 0. Since both Definition 5 below and [25] make
sure that minimum lateral distance is never smaller than µ, our
approach is more uniform.
Definition 5 (Minimum Lateral Distance Signal). Let f and
τ be, respectively, position and delay signals. We define minimum
lateral distance signal, denoted by dlatmin , as a function of type R≥0 −→C −→ C −→ R+ ∪ {−∞} that maps a time t and cars c1, c2 : C with
t1 B τ t c1 c1 and t2 B τ t c1 c2 to−∞ if c1 = c2, and to the following
term, otherwise:
µ + ρ | fv t1 c1 x | + ρ | fv t2 c2 x | +
1
2a
lat
max_accel ρ
2 +
(
| fv t1 c1 x | + ρ alatmax_accel
)2
2alatmin_brake
+
1
2a
lat
max_accel ρ
2 +
(
| fv t2 c2 x | + ρ alatmax_accel
)2
2alatmin_brake
Note that similar to Definition 4, minimum distance in Defini-
tion 5 is also computed using delayed observations. The only other
difference between Definition 5 and its correspondence in [25] is
that we do not assume car c1 is on the left of car c2. Finally, to the
best of our knowledge, the case when two cars move laterally in
the same direction is not considered in [25] and hence nor here 4.
According to Definition 2 and what comes after it, for any po-
sition signal f , there are unique velocity and acceleration signals.
However, according to Definition 4 and Definition 5, when response
time (ρ) is positive, there could be uncountably many minimum
longitudinal/lateral distance signals for f . This is because, we as-
sume velocity and acceleration are physical properties that are
defined using position. For example, if positions at times 1 and
3 are respectively 10 and 18 then (average) velocity during this
time is exactly 18−103−1 . However, we assume actual values of these
signals are obtained/observed with delay of at most ρ units of time.
Signal f (and hence signals fv and fa ) can take uncountably many
values during any positive duration of time. Therefore, there are
uncountably many possible minimum longitudinal/lateral distance
signals that can be observed/considered.
Definition 6 (Dangerous Longitudinal Situation Signal).
Let f , τ , and dlonmin be a position, delay, and minimum longitudi-
nal distance signals, respectively. We define dangerous longitudinal
situation signal, denoted by danglon, as a function of type R≥0 −→
C −→ C −→ {⊤,⊥} that maps a time t and cars c1, c2 : C with t1 B
τ t c1 c1 and t2 B τ t c1 c2 to to ⊤ exactly when value of dlonmin t c1 c2
is strictly larger than (f t2 c2 y) − (f t1 c1 y).
Definition 7 (Dangerous Lateral Situation Signal). Let
f , τ , and dlatmin be a position, delay, and minimum lateral distance
signals, respectively. We define dangerous lateral situation signal,
denoted by danglat, as a function of type R≥0 −→ C −→ C −→ {⊤,⊥}
that maps a time t and cars c1, c2 : C with t1 B τ t c1 c1 and
t2 B τ t c1 c2 to to ⊤ exactly when value of dlatmin t c1 c2 is strictly
larger than |(f t2 c2 x) − (f t1 c1 x)|.
We define dangerous situation signal, denoted by dang, as a
function of type R≥0 −→ C −→ C −→ {⊤,⊥} that maps time t : R≥0
and cars c1, c2 : C to the conjunction of (danglon t c1 c2) and
(danglat t c1 c2). Note that Definition 6 and Definition 7 also use
delayed observations in their definitions.
Definition 8 (Blame Time Signal). Let dang be a dangerous
situation signal. We define blame time signal, denoted by blame, as a
function of type R≥0 −→ C −→ C −→ R≥0 ∪ {∞} that maps time t : R≥0
and cars c1, c2 : C to
4We leave it to the reader to prove or disprove the necessity of considering that case.
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∞ if ¬dang t c1 c2 or ∀r : [0, t)·dang t c1 c2 5
t ′ if ∀r : (t ′, t]·dang r c1 c2 and∀t ′′ : [0, t ′)·∃r ′ : (t ′′, t ′]·¬dang r ′ c1 c2
We denote the blame time signals that are obtained by replacing dang
with danglon and danglat, respectively by blamelon and blamelat.
The second condition in Definition 8 uniquely defines value of
t ′. Intuitively, it is the smallest value t ′ for which the situation is
dangerous at any time between t ′ and t . Note that according to [25],
in the second case of Definition 8, instead of ∀t ′′ : [0, t ′)·∃r ′ :(t ′′, t ′]·¬dang r ′ c1 c2, we should have just said ¬dang t ′ c1 c2. It
is easy to see that our condition is strictly weaker. For example,
if t ′ > 0, dang t ′ c1 c2 = ⊤ and ∀r ′ : (0, t ′)·¬dang r ′ c1 c2 then
value of blame t c1 c2, according to Definition 8 is t ′, and according
to [25] is undefined. We leave it to the reader to (dis)prove that
Definition 6 and Definition 7 and whatever comes before them
guarantee dangerous signal is continuous from left, in which case
Definition 8 and its correspondent in [25] are equivalent.
According to the following quote from [25], by simply not mov-
ing, a car can have 0 longitudinal velocity for a long time, but it is
impossible for a car to keep its lateral velocity at 0. We believe this
is a mistake, since if a car does not move then it has zero velocity
in both directions. Furthermore, since we only consider position
signals with fully defined velocity and acceleration, the velocity
signal is continuous throughout the entire time. Therefore, when-
ever its sign is different at time t1 and t2, we know its value is 0 at
some time between t1 and t2, which is enough for the purpose of
this paper.
Unlike longitudinal velocity, which can be kept to a
value of 0 for a long time (the car is simply not mov-
ing), keeping lateral velocity at exact 0 is impossible
as cars usually perform small lateral fluctuations. It
is therefore required to introduce a robust notion of
lateral velocity.
We have everything we need to finally define a policy in Defini-
tion 9.
Definition 9 (Policy). Let f and τ be position and delay sig-
nals, respectively, and let signals dlonmin , d
lat
min , dang
lon, danglat, dang,
blamelon, blamelat, and blame be uniquely defined based on f and
τ , as specified in this section. For any time t : R≥0 and car c1 : C, we
say car c1 follows the policy at time t , denoted by P f τ t c1 iff for
any car c2 : C, if dang t c1 c2 = ⊤ and tb B blame t c1 c2 ∈ R then
the following conditions hold:
• If before the blame time there was a safe longitudinal distance
between c1 and c2 (i.e. tb = blamelon t c1 c2) then
(1) ∀t ′ : (tb , tb + ρ)· fa t ′ c1 y ≤ amax_accel, i.e. within the
response time, acceleration of the rear car must be bounded by
amax_accel.
(2) ∀t ′ : [tb+ρ, t]· fa t ′ c1 y ≤ −amin_brake, i.e. after the response
time, bound on acceleration decreases to −amin_brake (the rear
car must use its brake).
5The case ∀r : [0, t ) ·dang t c1 c2 is only considered here for completeness. However,
using additional constraints that will be given later, we would not consider any signal
that is initially dangerous, i.e. satisfies ∃c1, c2 : C ·dang 0 c1 c2 (note that value of
dang 0 c1 c2 is uniquely determined by values of f 0 c1 c2 and fv 0 c1 c2).
(3) ∀t ′ : (tb , t]· fa t ′ c2 y ≥ −amax_brake, i.e. there is bound on
how fast the front car can stop.
• If before the blame time there was a safe lateral distance between
c1 and c2 (i.e. tb = blamelat t c1 c2) then
(1) ∀t ′ : (tb , tb + ρ)·| fa t ′ c1 x | ≤ alatmax_accel, i.e. within the re-
sponse time, acceleration of car c1 must be bounded byalatmax_accel.
(2) ∀t ′ : [tb + ρ, t]·| fa t ′ c1 x | ≤ alatmin_brake and (fv t ′ c1 x) ×
(fa t ′ c1 x) ≤ 0, i.e. after the response time, bound on accelera-
tion decreases to alatmin_brake and acceleration and velocities are
in the opposite direction. (a.k.a. the c1 must use its brake).
We define P f τ c1 to be ∀t : R≥0·P f τ t c1 (i.e. car c1 always follows
the policy). Similarly, we define P f τ to be ∀c1 : C·P f τ c1 (i.e.
every car follows the policty at all time).
There are three differences between the first part of policy writ-
ten in Definition 9 and the one introduced in [25]. First, according to
Definition 9, there is no requirement on acceleration of the rear car
at time tb . We believe imposing a restriction at time tb is a mistake,
specially in [25], since by definition the situation is not dangerous at
tb and no car can look into the future of the system state. The next
two differences are more important. According to [25], after the
rear car reached to full stop, it can never move forward. Similarly,
after the front car reached to full stop it can never decelerate. We
believe either one of these policies is too restrictive to be allowed
in any real scenario. One implies if the rear car enters a dangerous
situation, it is going to stop on the road and never move again. The
other one implies if the front car enter into a dangerous situation
with a car on its behind, first it will fully stop and then if it moves,
it will never lower its speed. None of these makes any sense in
practical scenarios. These three differences also exists between the
second part of policy written in Definition 9 and the one introduced
in [25].
4 VERIFICATION PROBLEMS
We have specified dynamics and policy of cars in Section 3. In
this section we specify multiple verification problems about those
specifications. According to Section 3, for every position and delay
signals, minimum longitudinal and lateral distance signals (dlonmin and
dlatmin ), longitudinal and lateral dangerous situation signals (dang
lon,
danglat, and dang), and longitudinal and lateral blame time signals
(blamelon, blamelon, and blame), are all uniquely defined. There-
fore, in this section, whenever we consider a position and a delay
signal, we assume all the other signals can be used without intro-
duction. We divide our verification problems into three different
categories: (1) safety properties, (2) liveness properties, and (3) re-
sponsibility properties.
4.1 Safety Problems
Problem 10 (Safety). Prove or disprove that policy in Definition 9
guarantees utopia (i.e. prevents accident). More precisely, prove or
disprove the following formula cannot be satisfied by a position signal
4
f : LocC :
A1︷                                                                   ︸︸                                                                   ︷(
∃τ : DelayC · (∀c1, c2 : C·¬dang 0 c1 c2)︸                              ︷︷                              ︸
A2
∧ P f τ
)
∧
∃t : R≥0, c1, c2 : C· f t c1 = f t c2︸                                      ︷︷                                      ︸
A3
Condition A2 guarantees that the situation is not initially dan-
gerous. ConditionA1 guarantees f is initially not dangerous and it
follows policy as specified in Definition 9. ConditionA3 guarantees
that there will be an accident in the future. A system/policy is safe
iff the formula defined in Problem 10 is unsatisfiable. Finally note
that formula defined in Problem 10 depends on parameters given
in Table 1. We leave it to the reader to solve this problem for only
one or a class of values of these parameters.
Problem 10 ultimately depends on signals dlatmin and d
lon
min . Dis-
tances defined by these two signals are never smaller than the
same distances defined in [25]. However, as we mentioned multiple
times, there is a big difference here: in this paper definitions of
signals dlatmin and d
lon
min involve delay, while in [25] these signals are
defined using no delay (i.e. response time is zero) 6. Furthermore,
minimum/safe distance defined in Definition 4 uses the fact that
observations are made with no delay. This intuitively means that,
using policy and minimum distance defined in [25], cars can be-
come arbitrary close to each other. Therefore, it should be of no
surprise that if we compute minimum distance the same way as
in [25], but use delayed values for it, cars will crash. This informal
justification answers Problem 10 negatively. However, it is not clear
to us how one should fix this problem. For example, if we consider
delay, is it still true that the minimum distance is always exists,
or even to guarantee its existence one has to bound both velocity
and acceleration (policy in Definition 9 only bounds signals during
some intervals)? Furthermore, validity of any suggestion for fixing
this issue requires a formal proof, something that we look forward
to be done automatically.
Problem 10 completely ignores errors and uncertainties in each
cars’ sensors. As mentioned before, this is usually handled in the
context of robust verification. Note that there are many definitions
for robustness. What we put here is taken from [13] and is for
illustration purposes only. For any position signal f : LocC and
ϵ : R≥0, let Bϵ∞(f ) be the set of signals in LocC that are point-wise
ϵ-close to f . More precisely, f ′ ∈ Bϵ∞(f ) iff supt :R≥0 d(f t , f ′ t) ≤ ϵ ,
where d is the distance function used in the definition of signal.
Definition 11 (ϵ-Robust Safe and Unsafe Signals). Let A1
and A3 be the two predicates over position signals defined in Prob-
lem 10. A position signal f : LocC is called ϵ-robust safe iff it satisfies
the following formula:
A1(f ) ⇒ ∀f ′ : Bϵ∞(f )·¬A3(f ′)
6Authors in [25] only consider positive response time when a car responds to a
dangerous situation. However, observing position and velocity of the every other car
that is used to determine if a situation is dangerous is assumed to be performed within
0 response time.
Similarly, f : LocC is called ϵ-robust unsafe iff it satisfies the follow-
ing formula:
A1(f ) ∧ ∀f ′ : Bϵ∞(f )·A3(f ′)
A position signal is called robustly safe (unsafe) iff it is ϵ-robust safe
(unsafe) for some ϵ : R+. A policy is called ϵ-robust safe (unsafe) iff
all (some) position signals are ϵ-robust safe (unsafe) in that policy. A
policy is called robustly safe (unsafe) iff all (some) position signals
are robustly safe (unsafe) in that policy.
Note that it is impossible for a position signal (or a policy) to be
both robustly safe and unsafe. But it is possible for a position signal
(or a policy) to be neither robustly safe nor robustly unsafe.
Problem 12 (Robust Safety). Prove or disprove that the policy
in Definition 9 is robustly safe (or robustly unsafe). More precisely,
determine which of the following sentences are true and which ones
are false:
(1) ϵ-robust safe: ∀f : LocC ·A1(f ) ⇒ ∀f ′ : Bϵ∞(f )·¬A3(f ′)
(2) ϵ-robust unsafe: ∃f : LocC ·A1(f ) ∧ ∀f ′ : Bϵ∞(f )·A3(f ′)
(3) robustly safe:
∀f : LocC ·∃ϵ : R+·A1(f ) ⇒ ∀f ′ : Bϵ∞(f )·¬A3(f ′)
(4) robustly unsafe:
∃f : LocC ·∃ϵ : R+·A1(f ) ∧ ∀f ′ : Bϵ∞(f )·A3(f ′)
It should be easy to see that being ϵ-robust safe (unsafe) implies
being robustly safe (unsafe). But the converse is not necessarily
true.
4.2 Liveness Problems
Having a safe system is not enough, otherwise one could write
false as the simplest policy that guarantees safety of every system
(i.e. any behavior that satisfies this policy is safe). We also need to
make sure that it is possible for a signal to satisfy the policy that is
specified in Definition 9.
Problem 13 (Liveness). Prove or disprove that policy in Defini-
tion 9 is not inconsistent (i.e. it can be followed). More precisely, prove
or disprove the following formula can be satisfied by a position signal
f : LocC :
∀τ : DelayC ·(∀c1, c2 : C·¬dang 0 c1 c2) ∧ P f τ
In Problem 10 we have ∃τ : DelayC , but in Problem 13 we have
∀τ : DelayC . We chose to have this change, since for safety wewant
to say using any valid delay signal that together with the position
signal follow the policy, results in a safe behavior. However, for
liveness we want to say there is a position signal for which any
delay signal can be used to follow the policy. This is because the
intended use of delay is to allow a bounded amount of response
time, and any amount of delay within this bound should be allowed
by the policy.
Similar to the case of Problem 10 vs. Problem 13, just having
liveness is not enough. Otherwise, although in theory there is a
signal f : LocC that follows the policy, in practice, a car has to
always behave exactly like f (any deviation violates the policy)
which is never possible.
Definition 14 (ϵ-Robust Live Signals). A position signal f :
LocC is called ϵ-robust live iff it satisfies the following formula:
∀f ′ : Bϵ∞(f )· f ′ satisfies the formula defined in Problem 13
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A position signal is called robustly live iff it is ϵ-robust live for some
ϵ : R+. A policy is called robustly live iff some position signal f :
PosC is robustly live in it.
Problem 15 (Robust Liveness). Prove or disprove that the policy
in Definition 9 is robustly live.
Our definition of (robust) liveness is the minimum requirement
for system to be considered live and in practice one has to add more
constraints to it. For example, in order to consider a position signal f
live, one might want to also consider the following two constraints.
(1) Longitudinal position of every car diverges to infinity (∀u : R, c :
C·∃t : R≥0· f t c y > u). Otherwise, a policy that does not move
any car will be considered ∞-robust safe and live. (2) There are
always points in time at which all cars are moving for a positive
duration of time (∀t : R≥0·∃t1 : (t ,∞), t2 : (t1,∞)·∀r : (t1, t2), c :C· fv t c y > 0). Otherwise, a policy that moves only one car at
a time can be considered robustly live. Determining the exact set
of constraints for liveness is not a formal process and should be
determined using experience or simulation.
4.3 Responsibility-Sensitive Safety Problem
Our problems in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 only concern the case
in which every car follows the policy. However, there is always
someone on the road who drives recklessly. Authors in [25], in-
troduce the concept of “who is responsible for an accident”, and
instead of trying to come up with a policy that guarantees absence
of an accident, they come of with a policy that guarantees if a car
follows the policy then it won’t be held responsible for an accident.
Definition 16 (Responsibility for an Accident). Let f and
τ be position and delay signals, respectively. Let c1, c2 : C be two
cars, and let t : R≥0 be a time of accident between c1 and c2 (i.e.
f t c1 = f t c2). We say c1 is responsible for the accident with c2 at
time t iff dang t c1 c2 = ⊤ and c1 did not follow the policy (as specified
in Definition 9) at sometime during (tb , t], where tb B blame t c1 c2.
Once again considering delays distinguishes Definition 16 from
the same definition in [25]. For example, because of delays, blame
time (tb ) for an accident could be different in c1 and c2. Even worse,
it is not so much obvious that whenever there is an accident, there
will be a blame time. We consider these problems next. However, it
should be obvious that according to Definition 16, whoever follows
the policy won’t be held responsible for an accident.
Theorem 17 (Responsibility-Sensitive Safety). Whoever fol-
lows the policy won’t be held responsible for an accident.
Problem 18 (Existence of Responsible Party). Prove or dis-
prove that each accident has at least one responsible party. More
precisely, prove the following formula cannot be satisfied by any
signal f : LocC .
∃τ : DelayC , c1, c2 : C, t : R≥0, tb1 , tb2 : R≥0 ∪ {∞}·
f t c1 = c t c2 ∧ ¬dang 0 c1 c2 ∧ ¬dang 0 c2 c1(
tb1 = blame t c1 c2 ∧ ∀t ′ : (tb1 , t] ∩ R≥0·P f t ′ τ c1)∧(
tb2 = blame t c2 c1 ∧ ∀t ′ : (tb2 , t] ∩ R≥0·P f t ′ τ c2)
5 TOOLS
In Section 3 and Section 4, we defined system specifications as well
as five different fundamental problems about those specifications.
In this section, we look at different formal verification tools, and for
each tool we specify why our problems cannot be even expressed
using these tools. All of these tools are developed solely for the
purpose of model checking cyber-physical systems. Table 2 lists
these tools along where they fail to support required features. We
have identified six reasons. The first four prevent us from specifying
our models using these tools, and the last two prevents us from
specifying our verification problems using these tools. Note that we
completely ignored possible difficulties in expressing our models
and problems in the language of these tools, and the fact that C,
finite set of cars, is given as a parameter (i.e. it is fine if a tool can
solve these problems for a fixed known number of cars ≥ 2).
• Non-Linear Dynamics: Some tools do not support non-linear
dynamics. For example, UPPAAL is for model checking timed
automata, HyTech is for model checking rectangular automata,
SpaceEx, PHAVer, and HARE16 7 are for model checking hybrid
automata with affine dynamics. Note that support for non-linear
dynamics in HARE17, is only for flows and not discrete transitions.
• Ordinary Differential Inclusions (ODI): Some tools only support
ordinary differential equation and not ordinary differential in-
clusion. In Section 3, the only constraints that we ever put on
accelerations was some bound on its value in Definition 9. This
means velocity is restricted using some bound on its derivative.
• Delays in Dynamics: None of these tools supports having delays
in dynamics. In timed automata, delays in dynamics are closely
related to skewed clocks, and for a very large subclass of timed
automata, it is known how to handle skew clocks using UPPAAL [2,
6, 19, 23]. However, timed automata are far from what we need
to express our dynamics. Note that even if we set response time
(ρ) to 0, blame time and hence policy still depend on continuous
state of the system in the past.
• Unbounded State Space: Most tools that handle non-linear dy-
namics, require state space to be bounded using intervals for
every state variable. However, no state variable is bounded in
this paper.
• Unbounded Time: Similar to unbounded state space, most tools
that handle non-linear dynamics require time horizon to be
bounded. Note that bounding time does not necessarily bound
number of discrete transitions that can be taken within the given
bound [3, 24], and tools like dReach, C2E2, and Flow* also require
number of discrete transitions to be bounded as well.
• Robustness: None of these tools supports specifying robustness.
Similar to delays, in timed automata, robustness (as defined in
this paper) is similar to perturbing constraints. If we consider
perturbation of constraints for robustness, the problem has been
already solved for timed automata using UPPAAL [2, 6, 19, 23].
However, not only timed automaton, is far from what we need
in our specification, it is not even clear that robustness as de-
fined here (taken from [13]) is equivalent to robustness based on
perturbation of constraints.
7HARE16 [21] and HARE17 [22] are two different versions of the same tool. We decided
to separate them since only the older version supports ordinary differential inclusion.
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dReach [15] ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
SpaceEx [12] ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
PHAVer [11] ✗ ✗ ✗
HyTech [14] ✗ ✗ ✗
C2E2 [8] ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Flow* [4] ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
HARE16 [21] ✗ ✗ ✗
HARE17 [22] ✗ ✗ ✗
HSolver [20] ✗ ✗ ✗
UPPAAL [16] ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Table 2: Different model checkers and why they cannot be
used to solve our problems. Cross marks are where a tool
lacks a required support.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a challenge problem for formal veri-
fication tools developed or aimed to be developed for industrial
cyber-physical system. We formalized main components of dynam-
ics and policies introduced in [25] for autonomous vehicles driving
on a straight road. This also helped us to find some inconsistencies
with the current specifications in [25]. To the best of our knowledge,
no current automatic formal verification tool can be used to even
express these dynamics and problems. We hope this serves as a
challenge problem for formal tools targeting automatic verification
of industrial cyber-physical systems.
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